Georgia State University Law Review
Volume 34
Issue 4 Summer 2018

Article 6

8-1-2018

Deploying the Secret Police: The Use of Algorithms
in the Criminal Justice System
Jessica Gabel Cino
Georgia State University College of Law, jgcino@gsu.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr
Part of the Computer Law Commons, Constitutional Law Commons, Courts Commons,
Criminal Law Commons, Criminal Procedure Commons, Evidence Commons, Intellectual Property
Law Commons, Law and Society Commons, Law Enforcement and Corrections Commons, Legal
Ethics and Professional Responsibility Commons, and the Science and Technology Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Jessica G. Cino, Deploying the Secret Police: The Use of Algorithms in the Criminal Justice System, 34 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 1073 (2018).
Available at: https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr/vol34/iss4/6

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Publications at Reading Room. It has been accepted for inclusion in Georgia State
University Law Review by an authorized editor of Reading Room. For more information, please contact mbutler@gsu.edu.

Cino: Deploying the Secret Police: The Use of Algorithms in the Crimina

DEPLOYING THE SECRET POLICE: THE USE OF
ALGORITHMS IN THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE
SYSTEM
Jessica Gabel Cino*
Algorithms saturate our lives today; from curated song lists to
recommending “friends” and news feeds, they factor into some of the
most human aspects of decision-making, tapping into preferences
based on an ever-growing amount of data. Regardless of whether the
algorithm pertains to routing you around traffic jams or finding your
next dinner, there is little regulation and even less transparency
regarding just how these algorithms work. Paralleling this societal
adoption, the criminal justice system now employs algorithms in
some of the most important aspects of investigation and decisionmaking. The lack of oversight is abundantly apparent in the criminal
justice system where various algorithm-based tools are now routinely
deployed to investigate, prosecute, and sentence offenders. In the
absence of suitable safeguards, decisions affecting life and liberty are
contained in an impenetrable “black box.”1
I. Overview
Police agencies, crime labs, courts, and corrections departments
around the world use algorithms in a wide range of tools: facial
recognition programs, probabilistic DNA genotyping, and bail and
sentencing software. These proprietary tools are big business: law
enforcement and government agencies license or buy the software
*

Professor of Law, Georgia State University College of Law. I would like to thank my two intrepid
research assistants, Michael Duffey and Erik Badia, for their heavy lifting in bringing this article to
publication.
1. The phrase “black box” commonly refers to the actions companies take to keep the source code
containing the algorithm and related programming features secret. See Tom Simonite, AI Experts Want
to End ‘Black Box’ Algorithms in Government, WIRED (Oct. 18, 2017, 3:00 PM),
https://www.wired.com/story/ai-experts-want-to-end-black-box-algorithms-in-government/
[https://perma.cc/UPA6-SJ4G].
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from the private companies that purvey this technology—often on the
promise of reduced budget expenditures by removing hours of human
work. Once the software is installed, algorithmic outputs are
delivered to the operator. For most software running sophisticated
algorithms, the end user—often the government—had no hand in
writing the code or developing the ultimate product. Thus, a private
company owns the software and maintains a fist-hold on the source
code (which contains the algorithm), while the purchaser (including
the operator) has little to no knowledge as to how the algorithm
makes decisions or draws conclusions.2 This imbalance effectively
means that the software’s end users lack the ability to see how the
software makes decisions. This lack of transparency, in turn, leads to
serious consequences.
A. Science in the Courtroom
In the last twenty years, science (in particular, forensic science)
has become a mainstay in the criminal justice system. Thousands of
guilty defendants have been convicted with the help of forensic
techniques.3 In theory, scientific expert testimony must meet certain
standards of reliability before being admitted in court. In federal
2. Some software relies on a machine learning platform. See, e.g., Ben Schreck et al., Getting Value
from Machine Learning Isn’t About Fancier Algorithms—It’s About Making It Easier to Use, HARV.
BUS. REV. (Mar. 6, 2018), https://hbr.org/2018/03/getting-value-from-machine-learning-isnt-aboutfancier-algorithms-its-about-making-it-easier-to-use [https://perma.cc/3DXW-BV44]. The source code
defines the machine learning algorithm, which then compiles the actual algorithm on prior input and
converts it to output. Id. For example, in Google Maps, the source code doesn’t code the route; instead,
the source code accumulates data inputs from millions of users and forms a predictive model (an
algorithmically generated algorithm) to route the driver to the desired destination. See generally Ravi
Sharma, How Google Maps Gets Its Remarkably Accurate Real-Time Traffic Data, GADGETS360 (Mar.
2, 2017), https://gadgets.ndtv.com/apps/features/how-google-maps-gets-its-remarkably-accurate-realtime-traffic-data-1665385 [https://perma.cc/GN28-WWHG].
3. Jessica D. Gabel & Margaret D. Wilkinson, Good Science Gone Bad: How the Criminal Justice
System Can Redress the Impact of Flawed Forensics, 59 HASTINGS L.J. 1001, 1002 (2008). At the same
time, the Innocence Project estimates that forensic evidence with little to no probative value caused or
contributed to a wrongful conviction in at least eighty DNA exoneration cases the Project has evaluated.
Id.; see also DNA Exonerations in the United States, INNOCENCE PROJECT,
http://www.innocenceproject.org/dna-exonerations-in-the-united-states/
[https://perma.cc/3GM8CK7W] (last visited May 15, 2018) (reporting that 45% of the Innocence Project’s 356 DNA
exonerations “[i]nvolved misapplication of forensic science”).
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court and some state courts, the Daubert standard governs the
admissibility of such testimony.4 Under Daubert, a judge acts as a
gatekeeper and may admit scientific evidence as long as it is both
relevant and reliable.5 Other state courts have continued to follow the
earlier Frye standard, under which scientific evidence “must be
sufficiently established to have gained general acceptance in the
particular field in which it belongs” to be admissible.6 Despite these
roadblocks to admissibility, courts have routinely accepted much of
the so-called science underlying forensic testing with little, if any,
inquiry.7 Many forensic techniques, such as hair and fiber analysis,
toolmark comparison, and fingerprint analysis, rely upon little more
than a matching of patterns wherein a forensic analyst compares a
known sample to a questioned sample and makes the highly
subjective determination that the two samples originated from the
same source. Indeed, what passes as “science” plays a prominent role
in many cases because of its easy availability.
Because of this, forensic science’s armor has some cracks in it. For
example, in 2015, the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) and Federal
Bureau of Investigation (FBI) formally admitted that almost every
examiner in the FBI’s microscopic hair unit gave misleading,
exaggerated, or otherwise flawed testimony in criminal cases
between 1972 and 1999.8 A cloud of doubt now hangs over cases
involving hair evidence, but these cases are not alone. A committee
at the National Academy of Science (NAS) concluded in 2009 that
“no forensic method has been rigorously shown to have the capacity
to consistently, and with a high degree of certainty, demonstrate a
connection between evidence and a specific individual or source.”9
4. Daubert v. Merrill Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 597 (1993).
5. Id.
6. Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923); People v. Geier, 161 P.3d 104, 142
(Cal. 2007).
7. See, e.g., Johnson v. Commonwealth, 12 S.W.3d 258, 263–64 (Ky. 1999).
8. Spencer S. Hsu, FBI Admits Flaws in Hair Analysis Over Decades, WASH. POST (Apr. 18,
2015), http://wapo.st/1OrujpH?tid=ss_tw-bottom&utm_term=.17d035df6e5a [https://perma.cc/2LN4JX5E].
9. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L ACADS., STRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCIENCE IN THE
UNITED STATES: A PATH FORWARD 7 (2009). In recent years, studies of certain forensic fields have
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Simply put, the criminal justice system is “sending people to jail
based on bogus science.”10
The President’s Council of Advisors on Science and Technology
(PCAST) released a report on forensic science in September 2016.11
While the Council acknowledged the ongoing efforts to improve
forensic sciences after the 2009 NAS report, its report also
emphasized the significant problems in multiple disciplines of
forensic sciences.12 The PCAST report focused on pattern
identification evidence—evidence that requires interpretation by an
examiner.13 The main question asked by PCAST is whether pattern
identification evidence is supported by reproducible research.14
PCAST suggested a discipline of forensic science must satisfy two
types of validity.15 The first is foundational validity, which means
that the discipline is based on research and studies that are accurate
and reproducible.16 The second type of validity is applied validity,
which means that the method is reliably applied in practice.17 Among
the disciplines of forensic science PCAST examined, including DNA
demonstrated a lack of scientific foundation in testing methods, identified serious flaws, and questioned
the continued use of such techniques. See INNOCENCE PROJECT ARSON REVIEW COMM., REPORT ON THE
PEER REVIEW OF THE EXPERT TESTIMONY IN THE CASES OF STATE OF TEXAS V. CAMERON TODD
WILLINGHAM AND STATE OF TEXAS V. EARNEST RAY WILLIS 40 (2006) (“The significant lack of
understanding of the behavior of fire . . . can and does result in significant misinterpretations of fire
evidence, unreliable determinations, and serious miscarriages of justice with respect to the crime of
arson.”); NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L ACADS., BALLISTIC IMAGING 3 (Daniel L. Cork et
al. eds., 2008) (“The validity of the fundamental assumptions of uniqueness and reproducibility of
firearms-related toolmarks has not yet been fully demonstrated.”).
10. Kelly Servick, Reversing the Legacy of Junk Science in the Courtroom, SCI. MAG. (Mar. 7, 2016,
4:30
PM),
http://www.sciencemag.org/news/2016/03/reversing-legacy-junk-science-courtroom
[https://perma.cc/AD3E-LZG7].
11. PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL OF ADVISORS ON SCI. & TECH., EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT,
FORENSIC SCIENCE IN CRIMINAL COURTS: ENSURING SCIENTIFIC VALIDITY OF FEATURE-COMPARISON
METHODS at x (2016),
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/microsites/ostp/PCAST/pcast_forensic_science
_report_final.pdf [https://perma.cc/9XKM-TLG5] [hereinafter PCAST REPORT].
12. See id. at 1–20 (summarizing the Council’s findings and recommendations).
13. Id. at 1. Examples of such methods include the analysis of DNA, hair, latent fingerprints,
firearms and spent ammunition, toolmarks and bitemarks, shoeprints and tire tracks, and handwriting.
Id.
14. See id.
15. Id. at 4–5.
16. PCAST REPORT, supra note 11, at 4–5.
17. Id.
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analysis, bite marks, latent fingerprints, firearms identification, and
footwear analysis, the only valid discipline—using both foundational
and applied validity—was single-sourced DNA analysis, discussed
below.18
Technology presents itself as a powerful tool in criminal
investigations, so it is perhaps predictable that as our consumer
technology becomes “smarter,” so too does our crime-fighting
technology. At the same time, efficiency and speed should not be the
predominant factors in embracing technology, particularly in the
legal field. The integrity of a criminal trial, and its attendant
constitutional protections, must be maintained, and a fair trial
requires that the evidence presented be relevant, reliable, and not
unduly prejudicial.19

18. Id. at 7–14. The PCAST report received criticism for its findings, most notably from those on the
prosecutorial side of the aisle. See, e.g., Press Release, Nat’l Dist. Attorneys Ass’n, National District
Attorneys Association Slams President’s Council of Advisors on Science and Technology Report (Sept.
2, 2016), http://www.ndaa.org/pdf/NDAA%20Press%20Release%20on%20PCAST%20Report.pdf
[https://perma.cc/78ME-W4TC]. PCAST responded in detail, noting: “Forensic science is at a
crossroads. There is growing recognition that the law requires that a forensic feature-comparison method
be established as scientifically valid and reliable before it may be used in court and that this requirement
can only be satisfied by actual empirical testing.” PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL OF ADVISORS ON SCI. & TECH.,
EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, AN ADDENDUM TO THE PCAST REPORT ON FORENSIC SCIENCE IN
CRIMINAL COURTS 9 (2017),
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/microsites/ostp/PCAST/pcast_forensics_adden
dum_finalv2.pdf [https://perma.cc/6NTR-U2VW]. PCAST also encouraged forensic science to be the
author of its own destiny. Id.
19. William C. Thompson, The Potential for Error in Forensic DNA Testing (and How That
Complicates the Use of DNA Databases for Criminal Identification) 2 (Aug. 12, 2008) (unpublished
paper), http://www.councilforresponsiblegenetics.org/pageDocuments/H4T5EOYUZI.pdf
[https://perma.cc/ML9J-EK99]. Indeed, there is recent and ongoing precedent for such a practice. The
so-called psychopath test is often dispositive as to matters of parole and influential as to sentencing.
Alix Spiegel, Can a Test Really Tell Who’s a Psychopath?, NPR (May 26, 2011, 2:24 PM),
http://www.npr.org/2011/05/26/136619689/can-a-test-really-tell-whos-a-psychopath.
[https://perma.cc/DV9U-5VE9]. The test has even influenced whether the death penalty is administered.
Id. This use of the test remains pervasive—even though the test’s creator has expressed concern over the
practice. Ira Glass et al., The Psychopath Test, THIS AM. LIFE (May 27, 2011),
https://www.thisamericanlife.org/radio-archives/episode/436/the-psychopath-test
[https://perma.cc/XC8W-P4PV] (interviewing Bob Hare, the test’s creator).
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B. Algorithms: Behind the Black Box
In its most basic form, an algorithm is a series of instructions that
tells a computer what to do, similar to a recipe that describes how to
make a particular dish. Algorithms can be reduced to three simple
operations, not unlike a Westlaw or Lexis search: AND, OR, and
NOT. That is the basic premise of an algorithm. Of course, the
complexities increase dramatically from those fundamental operating
commands. In one way or another, most of these systems are
examples of machine learning. Such systems do not just repeat a
stable set of instructions; they rewrite themselves as they work and,
depending on the software, produce additional algorithms. It is the
final output of these “self-authored” programs upon which the end
user relies.
Using Google Maps as an example, say that you want to go
shopping at a store located about twenty minutes away. Google Maps
will use four different algorithms to give you an estimated arrival
time: (1) by car; (2) on foot; (3) on a bicycle; and (4) on public
transportation. All four of these algorithms reach the same result—
getting you to the store—but each algorithm does so in a completely
different way. Each algorithm also has a different cost and a different
travel time. The same is true in more sophisticated applications of
algorithms. The precise algorithm being used would be difficult to
isolate because developers (the humans behind the black box) are
unique, and thus, the structure and approach of any algorithm will be
unique from one developer to the next. This only adds to the
notorious opacity of algorithms and machine learning.
In the criminal justice arena, the touted advantage to using
algorithmic software to investigate, prosecute, and sentence offenders
is the ability to neuter an otherwise subjective process.20 The output
is meant to be more objective than, for example, a judge, jury, or law
20. See DANIELLE KEHL ET AL., ALGORITHMS IN THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM: ASSESSING THE
USE OF RISK ASSESSMENTS IN SENTENCING 6 (2017),
https://dash.harvard.edu/bitstream/handle/1/33746041/201707_responsivecommunities_2.pdf?sequence=1 [https://perma.cc/A5QD-YERJ].
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enforcement official. As a result, the twin goals of maximizing public
safety and satisfying procedural fairness seem to be met.21 Although
these are certainly laudable goals, the issue remains: an algorithm is a
software program that uses specific input to develop a predictive
method. A known truism of software development is “garbage in,
garbage out,” which means that the result coming out is only as good
as the data that went in.22 Applied to software used for criminal
justice purposes, this principle indicates that biased input from biased
sources will inevitably lead to biased results. For example, failing to
control for race in a poorly-optimized algorithm could result in
sentencing software that gives black defendants inordinately higher
sentences. Similarly, the same algorithm could overcorrect for gender
because almost all offenders in prison are male. The sought-after
neutrality boasted by algorithmic software is a much more difficult
concept to actualize than it is to espouse.
The reality is that no algorithm can perfectly produce the optimal
output, and all predictive software will differ. The disparity between
the proclaimed advantages of such software and its real-life flaws
then creates a tension between constitutional fairness and fighting
crime. Moreover, the complexity of algorithms dissuades questions
about accuracy; algorithms are perceived or marketed as too difficult
to understand for either the individuals using them (criminal justice
stakeholders) or for the people they apply to (defendants and
prisoners).
II. Development Breakthroughs and Run-Time Errors
The emergence of algorithmic analysis programs creates new
problems in a legal system increasingly ill-equipped to keep pace.
The software is pricey, but widespread adoption will decrease the
costs and will make the programs cheap enough even for smaller
21. Sam Corbett-Davies et al., Algorithmic Decision Making and the Cost of Fairness, 23 SIGKDD
CONF.
ON
KNOWLEDGE
DISCOVERY
&
DATA
MINING
797,
797
(2017),
http://www.kdd.org/kdd2017/papers/view/algorithmic-decision-making-and-the-cost-of-fairness
[https://perma.cc/7KUK-XWFE] (click link below abstract to download full article).
22. L.J. KUTTEN & FREDERIC M. WILF., 3 COMPUTER SOFTWARE § 12:55 (2017).
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jurisdictions to afford. Some jurisdictions are employing three of
these algorithm-based technologies upon which this article will
focus: probabilistic DNA genotyping, facial recognition, and
sentencing software.
A. Probabilistic Genotyping: Unlocking Pandora’s Box
In terms of biology, DNA “is the body’s instruction manual.”23 It
determines everything about an individual, from height to musical
aptitude.24 Said another way, our DNA determines who we are and
makes each one of us a unique being.25 Not only does our DNA make
us unique as individuals, our DNA itself is unique.26 Other than
identical twins, no two people share the same DNA.27 Because of this
distinctive quality, forensic scientists can extract DNA from two
samples and determine if the samples have a high likelihood of being
from the same source.28
From its initial development in the 1980s as an identification tool,
the use of DNA in criminal cases—both to convict defendants and
exonerate the wrongly convicted—has been prolific. By the 1990s,
Congress focused on forensic DNA research and development.29 As
DNA continued to expand its footprint as the ostensible gold standard
in criminal investigations, an extraordinary amount of federal
funding allocated to crime labs was specifically earmarked for DNA
expansion.30 Because of this, research and development of new DNA
analytical techniques was a lucrative business. Indeed, the abundance
in funding for DNA collection, testing, and retention far outstripped
other crime lab allotments, despite the fact that DNA analysis only

23. D.P. LYLE, FORENSIC SCIENCE 179 (2012).
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. See id.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 187–88.
29. Jessica Gabel Cino, Tackling Technical Debt: Managing Advances in DNA Technology That
Outpace the Evolution of Law, 54 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 373, 373 (2017).
30. Id.
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represented a small portion of crime lab work at that time.31 Two
decades later, DNA testing is now a primary hub of many labs,
forcing other traditional forensic lab departments—such as trace
evidence or fingerprints—to cut back or close shop.32
1. Great in Theory
DNA remains the gold standard for solving crimes, bolstered by
academics and verified by scientific studies and experts around the
world. Since the advent of DNA testing, nearly 200 people have been
exonerated using newly tested evidence;33 in some places, courts will
only consider exonerations with DNA evidence.34 Juries, too, have
become more trusting of DNA, as evidenced by an increased
likelihood of convictions in cases involving DNA evidence.35 But, as
the PCAST report notes, “DNA analysis, like all forensic analyses, is
not infallible in practice.”36
Many errors in DNA analysis are caused by humans: for example,
one Texas crime lab was staffed with poorly trained technicians using
outdated techniques. Others in Texas were found to be “drylabbing”—reporting results without doing any actual testing—
leading to inaccurate results and hundreds, if not thousands, of
subsequent appeals from relevant convictions, including at least one
capital case.37 But DNA analysis of complex mixtures—the kind that
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Exonerations by Year: DNA and Non-DNA, NAT’L REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS (2018),
https://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Pages/Exoneration-by-Year.aspx
[https://perma.cc/YE5W-LV85].
34. See Deborah F. Buckman, Annotation, Validity, Construction, and Application of State Statutes
and Rules Governing Requests for Postconviction DNA Testing, 72 A.L.R.6th 227 (2012).
35. Joseph L. Peterson et al., Effect of Forensic Evidence on Criminal Justice Case Processing, 58 J.
FORENSIC SCI. S78, S80 (2013).
36. PCAST REPORT, supra note 11, at 7; see also Matthew Shaer, The False Promise of DNA
Testing, ATLANTIC (June 2016), https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2016/06/a-reasonabledoubt/480747/ [https://perma.cc/EA2U-2YBW].
37. Eric Dexheimer, Austin Crime Lab Bucked DNA Standard for Years, Yet Got Passing Grades,
AUSTIN AM.-STATESMAN (Jan. 12, 2017, 11:45 AM), https://www.mystatesman.com/news/crime—
law/austin-crime-lab-bucked-dna-standard-for-years-yet-got-passinggrades/MZBboOfzXWWgqlem6867TO/ [https://perma.cc/KB2K-DGYF]; Chuck Lindell, Court:
Examine If Austin Crime Lab Botched Death Penalty Evidence, AUSTIN AM.-STATESMAN (Oct. 18,
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require probabilistic genotype matching—is particularly error-prone.
According to the PCAST report, sufficient evidence to establish
foundational validity for complex mixtures has not yet emerged.38
When the technology was first developed, DNA matching required
a significantly intact sample, pure and unpolluted by other bodily
fluids, also known as single-source DNA.39 As technology has
improved, more processes, such as probabilistic genotyping, have
become available to detect DNA in ultra-miniscule amounts; the
DNA left by a finger touching a glass or even the saliva on a cigarette
butt is sometimes enough.40 Probabilistic genotyping can analyze
such small amounts of DNA by using the kind of complex code that
would be impossible for a human—but not a computer—to run.41
These processes can also often parse DNA when samples from
multiple people are mixed together.42 Through probabilistic genotype
matching, programs like TrueAllele and STRMIX claim to reliably
identify individual DNA strands presented in a multi-contributor or
otherwise-dirty biological morass.43
The scientifically tested methods of polymerase chain reaction
(PCR) and short tandem repeat (STR) differ in several respects from
probabilistic genotyping testing, which uses a smaller—sometimes
degraded, sometimes mixed—sample.44 Probabilistic genotyping thus
requires more subjective profile interpretation on the part of an
analyst.45 Profile interpretation is perhaps the most troubling feature

2017, 2:14 PM), https://www.statesman.com/news/court-examine-austin-crime-lab-botched-deathpenalty-evidence/Fue0LIlp74CTWSUXoSrXuO/ [https://perma.cc/9DGR-FQV3].
38. PCAST REPORT, supra note 11, at 8.
39. Id. at 70.
40. The
Problem
of
Probabilistic
Genotyping,
FORENSIC
INST.
(Apr.
2017),
http://www.theforensicinstitute.com/news-articles/views-and-opinions/dna-interpretation-software
[https://perma.cc/5BB5-XVNW].
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Mark W. Perlin et al., TrueAllele Genotype Identification on DNA Mixtures Containing Up to
Five Unknown Contributors, 60 J. FORENSIC SCI. 857, 857 (2015).
44. Frederick R. Bieber et al., Evaluation of Forensic DNA Mixture Evidence: Protocol for
Evaluation, Interpretation, and Statistical Calculations Using the Combined Probability of Inclusion, 17
BMC GENETICS 1, 1–4 (2016).
45. People v. Megnath, 898 N.Y.S.2d 408, 413 (Sup. Ct. 2010).
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of probabilistic genotyping because it inherently creates the greatest
potential for human error. Profile interpretation involves a hazardous
assumption about which alleles are or are not present. Once the
profile is compiled by the machine component of the DNA analysis,
the forensic scientist must manually interpret that profile.46 The
increased number of amplification cycles injects many variables in
the profiles.47 The forensic scientist interpreting the sample must
account for these variables.48 Thus, different forensic scientists may
interpret the resulting profiles differently; this creates a nearimpossible hurdle for a criminal defendant to overcome, especially if
probabilistic genotyping is the sole DNA evidence used because it is
nearly impossible to challenge.
In the early 1990s, much of the work in the DNA field focused on
single-source DNA profiles and sought to achieve an exact match
between the crime scene sample and the suspect’s sample.49 Later in
the 1990s, Cybergenetics, a bioinformation company, began focusing
on forensic technology and patented various algorithms that promised
to discriminate and separate the presence of individual DNA profiles
from a sample that might include several people’s biological
products.50 The tool, called TrueAllele, promises an unparalleled
advantage in criminal investigations. TrueAllele’s marketing material
guarantees its results are free of subjective error and bias.51 The
founder of Cybergenetics quickly became an outspoken advocate and
salesman for the tool’s use, and by 2009, the first TrueAllele case
reached a courtroom.52 At the end of the day, however,

46. Bruce Budowle et al., A Perspective on Errors, Bias, and Interpretation in the Forensic Sciences
and Direction for Continuing Advancement, 54 J. FORENSIC SCI. 798, 803–04 (2009).
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Jessica Pishko, The Impenetrable Program Transforming How Courts Treat DNA Evidence,
WIRED (Nov. 29, 2017, 7:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/story/trueallele-software-transforming-howcourts-treat-dna-evidence [https://perma.cc/RF5E-6VFF].
50. Id.
51. LAW SERVICES, CYBERGENETICS,
https://www.cybgen.com/solutions/brochures/law_brochure.pdf [https://perma.cc/23YX-MANE] (last
visited May 12, 2018).
52. Pishko, supra note 49.
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Cybergenetics is a business with the goal of making money. Because
it is a private, for-profit business, TrueAllele comes with a high price
tag. A license to use TrueAllele costs $60,000.53 But the very thing
that makes tools like TrueAllele valuable to courts—their ability to
make connections that elude humans—also makes it difficult for
those courts to assess the product’s validity.
2. Problems in Execution
In 2017, a ProPublica investigation uncovered aspects of the
probabilistic software used by New York City forensic labs that
might make the results unreliable.54 As New York forensic labs
switched to STRmix—another probabilistic software—a coalition of
criminal defense attorneys called for the New York State Inspector
General to investigate the lab.55 Similarly, in 2014, a judge found that
STRmix contained coding errors involving certain mixtures of threeperson DNA samples, which contributed to misleading results.56
After the incident, STRmix released the algorithm publicly.57 But the
cofounder of STRmix, John Buckleton, believes the algorithm is far
too complex for lawyers to unpack and determine whether the tool is
free from error or bias.58 Keeping the code public may quell critics of
the black box but does little to assist in determining what inputs were
used in its programming.59
TrueAllele is under the microscope more than ever before.
Attorneys representing Billy Ray Johnson, a currently incarcerated
53. Id.
54. Lauren Kirchner, Thousands of Criminal Cases in New York Relied on Disputed DNA Testing
Techniques, PROPUBLICA (Sept. 4, 2017, 6:00 PM), https://www.propublica.org/article/thousands-ofcriminal-cases-in-new-york-relied-on-disputed-dna-testing-techniques [https://perma.cc/49SV-MZTL].
55. Id.
56. David Murray, Queensland Authorities Confirm ‘Miscode’ Affects DNA Evidence in Criminal
Cases, COURIER-MAIL (Mar. 20, 2015, 8:00 AM),
http://www.couriermail.com.au/news/queensland/queensland-authorities-confirm-miscode-affects-dnaevidence-in-criminal-cases/news-story/833c580d3f1c59039efd1a2ef55af92b [https://perma.cc/NBG5PUKW].
57. Pishko, supra note 49.
58. Id.
59. Id.
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man who claims he was wrongfully convicted based on evidence
processed by TrueAllele, are not so quick to accept Cybergenetics’
assurances of accuracy.60 In a newsletter, Cybergenetics writes about
the Johnson case, saying that TrueAllele obtained results for eight
samples where other methods found the results “inconclusive.”61 This
should give anyone pause. But the newsletter further states that guilty
pleas regularly follow TrueAllele’s interpretation of previously
inconclusive DNA samples.62 This has caused the American Civil
Liberties Union (ACLU) to intervene. As the ACLU indicates in its
amicus brief for Johnson, the companies writing and selling
algorithms like TrueAllele often serve the prosecution as their
primary client, and—whether explicitly stated or not—that client is
often best satisfied with more matches.63 With such an incentive
structure in place, it may be naïve to take Cybergenetics’ assertions at
face value.
Further, Johnson’s lawyers argue that the source code is crucial to
their defense even if TrueAllele’s motives are entirely benign.64 The
claim that any algorithmic software such as TrueAllele is able to
make decisions entirely detached from human bias is not based in
reality.65 From the bottom up, an algorithm must interpret large
amounts of data and quantify the relevance of each piece; such a
process is largely subjective, and algorithms merely apply a uniform
level of subjectivity across the board.66 In addition to built-in human
bias, almost all software carries an expected number of programming
60. Vera Eidelman, Secret Algorithms Are Deciding Criminal Trials and We’re Not Even Allowed to
Test Their Accuracy, AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION (Sept. 15, 2017, 2:00 PM),
https://www.aclu.org/blog/privacy-technology/surveillance-technologies/secret-algorithms-are-decidingcriminal-trials-and [https://perma.cc/F8Z7-UKQ8].
61. Jeffrey
K.
Robinson,
Cybergenetics
June/July
2015
Newsletter
(2015),
http://www.duq.edu/assets/Documents/forensics/CybgenNewsJuneJuly2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/EJ84GVLS].
62. Id.
63. Brief of Amici Curiae Am. Civil Liberties Union & Am. Civil Liberties Union S. Cal. in Support
of Defendant-Appellant Seeking Reversal at 15–16, California v. Johnson, No. F071640 (Cal. Ct. App.
Sept. 14, 2017).
64. Id. at 22.
65. Id. at 12.
66. Id. at 12–13.
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errors in the source code.67 Even conservative estimates suggest that
more than a dozen material errors are hidden amongst TrueAllele’s
thousands of lines of code.68
Johnson’s case is just one of many that used TrueAllele or similar
systems from other developers that promise their proprietary software
will reveal all the secrets of DNA. But Johnson’s lawyers—along
with the ACLU, the Electronic Frontier Foundation, and the Northern
California Innocence Project—are making the case that the trial
court’s decision not to allow defense experts to examine the source
code prevented Johnson from receiving a fair trial.69 Jennifer
Friedman, the forensic expert for the Los Angeles Public Defender’s
Office, which also submitted a brief in the Johnson trial, compared
the shift from single-source DNA to probabilistic DNA analysis to
the difference between algebra and calculus.70
In trial documents in other cases, TrueAllele’s front man Mark
Perlin argues that allowing others to see his company’s source code
would violate his right to a trade secret and ultimately threaten his
business.71 He casts unlocking the code as unnecessary because his
company performs its own quality control.72 Perlin complains that the
ACLU (and others) are just trying to “sow[] confusion” over an
“unbiased system.”73
Despite Cybergenetics’ apparent dread of being compelled to
reveal its trade secret, TrueAllele recently promised to make the code
accessible to defense attorneys for a mere $10,000, plus $2,000 a
day.74 This “generosity” is entirely self-serving—it preserves

67. Id. at 15.
68. Id.
69. Brief of Amici Curiae, supra note 63, at 29.
70. Pishko, supra note 49.
71. Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on Defense Motion to Compel Cybergenetics’
TrueAllele Casework Source Code at 5, Washington v. Fair, No. 10-1-09274-5 (Wash. Super. Ct. Jan.
12, 2017).
72. Id.
73. Press Release, Cybergentics, ACLU Zealots March Against Truth-Seeking DNA Technology
(Sept. 19, 2017), https://www.cybgen.com/information/newsroom/2017/sep/ACLU-zealots-marchagainst-truth-seeking-DNA-technology.shtml [https://perma.cc/CAU7-7S8E].
74. See Pishko, supra note 49.
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Cybergenetics’ profit margin while shortchanging defendants who
lack the financial resources to afford such a measure.
In October, the Department of Commerce’s National Institute of
Standards and Technology (NIST) announced that it would embark
on a study to determine the reliability of DNA testing, including the
algorithmic methods used by companies like TrueAllele.75
Expectedly, Perlin condemned this research, which NIST says serves
to establish foundational validity (something the PCAST report noted
has been lacking) of the methodology.76 Perlin met this
announcement with hostility aimed at external peer review (a
foundational requisite for scientific validation) and derided the study
as a governmental attack on science.77 Perlin vehemently argued that
prior scientific, peer-reviewed research studies had verified
TrueAllele’s validity.78 Of course, the studies that Perlin relied on
were self-serving, internal validation studies sponsored and
conducted by Cybergenetics.79
The chief DNA scientist at NIST, Dr. John Butler, is a preeminent
DNA expert80 who understands the issues related to probabilistic
DNA analysis. Butler explained that the NIST study focused on
measuring and evaluating differentiations in software responses.81
75. NIST to Assess the Reliability of Forensic Methods for Analyzing DNA Mixtures, NAT’L INST. OF
STANDARDS & TECH. (Oct. 3, 2017), https://www.nist.gov/news-events/news/2017/10/nist-assessreliability-forensic-methods-analyzing-dna-mixtures [https://perma.cc/PRP4-5JXF].
76. Id.; see also Press Release, Cybergenetics, NIST Launches Wasteful Study That Undermines
Science and Justice (Oct. 5, 2017), https://www.cybgen.com/information/newsroom/2017/oct/NISTlaunches-wasteful-study-that-undermines-science-and-justice.shtml# [https://perma.cc/4BCV-SXTY].
77. Press Release, supra note 76; see also NAT’L INST. OF STANDARDS & TECH., VALIDATION
STANDARDS
FOR
PROBABILISTIC
GENOTYPING
SYSTEMS
8–9
(2016),
https://www.nist.gov/sites/default/files/documents/2017/10/13/validation_standards_for_probabilistic_g
enotyping_systems_3.pdf [https://perma.cc/83RM-9NQA].
78. TrueAllele, Virginia TrueAllele Validation Study: Casework Comparison, YOUTUBE (Oct. 6,
2015), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jS4tHVkb87k&feature=youtu.be [https://perma.cc/VPY9KFMD].
79. Id.; TrueAllele, Practical Aspects of the Implementation of TrueAllele Casework, YOUTUBE
(July 29, 2015), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8Qoetze3fkE [https://perma.cc/4GTG-5JNX].
80. John
Butler,
NAT’L INST. OF STANDARDS & TECH. (Apr.
4,
2017),
https://www.nist.gov/people/john-butler [https://perma.cc/D8EL-TM2R].
81. Lauren Kirchner, Putting Crime Scene DNA Analysis on Trial, PROPUBLICA (Oct. 11, 2017, 8:00
AM), https://www.propublica.org/article/putting-crime-scene-dna-analysis-on-trial
[https://perma.cc/7EQU-F3ST].
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Dr. Mike Coble at NIST, an expert on forensic sciences who has
published his own studies on probabilistic genotyping,82 explained
that NIST’s research focused on the practice of mixture evaluations
as a whole rather than on individual companies.83 Coble explained
that the study is aimed at education across the criminal justice
system—lawyers, judges, and juries: “There’s a real hunger and
desire to understand what’s going on in that box, what the program is
doing[,] and how does it do this.”84
Information and transparency is sorely needed, but is it enough?
Even the best defense lawyers may lack the resources and
foundational knowledge needed to parse the nuances of the
technology into flaws. Beyond the resource gap is the fundamental
issue of a criminal defendant’s right to due process. TrueAllele could
be garbage or gospel, but that should not change a defendant’s right
to see what is in the box that could put him or her away for life.85
B. Facial Recognition Software
The Trump administration’s efforts to impose new immigration
rules drew attention—and legal fire—for restrictions placed on the
ability of people born in certain majority Muslim countries to enter
the U.S.86 In the frenzy of concern, one obscure provision of the
executive orders was given little attention: an expansion of facial
recognition systems in major U.S. airports to monitor people leaving
the U.S. in hopes of catching individuals who have overstayed their
visas or are wanted in criminal investigations.87
82. See Michael Coblei, NAT’L INST. OF STANDARDS & TECH., https://strbase.nist.gov/Coble.htm
[https://perma.cc/46YD-ZNR8] (last visited Apr. 4, 2018).
83. Pishko, supra note 49.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Laura Jarrett, Trump Administration Appealing Halt of Revised Travel Ban, CNN (Mar. 30,
2017,
6:15
PM),
https://www.cnn.com/2017/03/29/politics/hawaii-trump-travel-ban-extended
[https://perma.cc/A5WU-HGVJ]; Trump’s Executive Order on Immigration, Annotated, NPR (Jan. 31,
2017, 10:46 AM), https://www.npr.org/2017/01/31/512439121/trumps-executive-order-on-immigrationannotated [https://perma.cc/6TNE-JEX9].
87. Aliya Sternstein, Trump’s Immigration Order Vastly Expands Border Surveillance, CHRISTIAN
SCI. MONITOR (Feb. 10, 2017), https://www.csmonitor.com/World/Passcode/2017/0210/Trump-s-
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This type of facial recognition is essentially a much more powerful
version of the same type of technology your phone or computer
might use to identify friends in your photos, and the possible
applications are extensive.88 Using computers to recognize people’s
faces and validate their identities can streamline access control for
secure corporate and government buildings or devices.89 Some
systems can identify known or suspected criminals.90 Businesses can
analyze their customers’ faces to help tailor marketing strategies to
people of different genders, ages, and ethnic backgrounds.91 Even
some consumer product companies are taking advantage of facial
recognition technology through services such as virtual eyeglass
fitting.92
Serious privacy concerns are also raised as government agencies
and companies are better able to track individuals through their
communities and even around the world. The facial recognition
market is currently worth approximately $4 billion and is expected to
grow to more than $7 billion by 2022.93 Surveillance is a large reason
for growth, and government entities are the primary consumers in the
market.94 The FBI has a database with images of approximately half
the U.S. population.95 Some commentators have expressed fear of
immigration-order-vastly-expands-border-surveillance [https://perma.cc/968B-H6R5].
88. iPhoto ‘09 & iPhoto ‘11: Improving Face Recognition Results, APPLE SUPPORT (May 6, 2016),
https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT201891 [https://perma.cc/RAX6-NCU7].
89. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-15-621, FACIAL RECOGNITION TECHNOLOGY:
COMMERCIAL USES, PRIVACY ISSUES, AND APPLICABLE FEDERAL LAW 9 (2015).
90. Id. at 8.
91. Id. at 9.
92. Frederico Viticci, iPhone App with Face Tracking Technology Lets You Try Virtual Glasses,
MACSTORIES (Feb. 23, 2011, 5:32 PM), https://www.macstories.net/news/iphone-app-with-facetracking-technology-lets-you-try-virtual-glasses [https://perma.cc/6XPS-QSGN].
93. Laura Wood, Facial Recognition Market 2017 by Component, Technology, Use Case, End-User,
and Region—Global Forecast to 2022—Research and Markets, BUS. WIRE (Dec. 1, 2017, 9:30 AM),
https://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20171201005396/en/ [https://perma.cc/HN73-8Z82].
94. See id.; see also Jessica Gabel Cino, Facial Recognition Is Increasingly Common, But How Does
It Work?, CONVERSATION (Apr. 4, 2017, 9:09 PM), http://theconversation.com/facial-recognition-isincreasingly-common-but-how-does-it-work-61354 [https://perma.cc/7GCZ-TEEU].
95. Olivia Solon, Facial Recognition Database Used by FBI Is Out of Control, House Committee
Hears, GUARDIAN (Mar. 27, 2017, 6:00 AM),
https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2017/mar/27/us-facial-recognition-database-fbi-driverslicenses-passports [https://perma.cc/7XLA-DEZH].
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people using facial recognition to engage in online harassment or
even real-world stalking.96
As facial recognition becomes more common, we must know how
it works. As someone who studies and researches the legal
implications of new technology in criminal investigations, I believe it
is important to understand what it can and cannot do and how the
technology is progressing. Only then can we have informed
discussions about when and how to use computers to recognize that
most human of features—our faces.
1. Great in Theory
As one of several methods of what are called “biometric”
identification systems, facial recognition examines physical features
of a person’s body in an attempt to uniquely distinguish one person
from all the others.97 Other forms of this type of work include
fingerprint matching, retina scanning, and even voice recognition.98
All of these systems take in data—often an image—from an
unknown person, analyze the data in that input, and attempt to match
the individual to existing entries in a database of known persons’
faces or voices.99 Facial recognition does this in three steps:
detection, faceprint creation, and verification or identification.100

96. Jeff John Roberts, Our Facial Recognition Nightmare Is Upon Us, FORTUNE (May 20, 2016),
http://fortune.com/2016/05/20/facial-recognition-nightmare [https://perma.cc/T22P-DBPW].
97. What Is Face Recognition?, FACEFIRST, https://www.facefirst.com/face-recognitionglossary/what-is-face-recognition/ [https://perma.cc/UK7S-B5SQ].
98. Justin Lee, Pindrop Voice Authentication to Be Integrated with Amazon Connect, BIOMETRIC
UPDATE (Mar. 29, 2017), https://www.biometricupdate.com/201703/pindrop-voice-authentication-to-beintegrated-with-amazon-connect [https://perma.cc/85E5-8DE7]; Mark Rockwell, Making Fingerprints
More Reliable Biometrics, GCN (Jan. 26, 2017), https://gcn.com/articles/2017/01/26/iarpafingerprints.aspx [https://perma.cc/GKU2-2MBD]; Jeffrey A. Tucker, Welcome Aboard, but First US
Marshals Will Scan Your Retina, FOUNDATION FOR ECON. EDUC. (Feb. 25, 2017),
https://fee.org/articles/welcome-aboard-but-first-us-marshals-will-scan-your-retina
[https://perma.cc/U645-YAPE].
99. See generally Anil K. Jain, Arun Ross & Silil Prabhakar, An Introduction to Biometric
Recognition, 4 IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON CIRS. & SYSS. FOR VIDEO TECH. 4, 4 (2004).
100. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 89, at 4.
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When an image is captured, computer software analyzes it to
identify where the faces are in, say, a crowd of people.101 In a mall,
for example, security cameras will feed into a computer with facial
recognition software to identify faces in the video feed.102 Once the
system has identified any potential faces in an image, it looks more
closely at each face.103 Sometimes the image must be reoriented or
resized.104 A face very close to the camera may seem tilted or
stretched slightly; someone farther from the camera may appear
smaller or even partially hidden from view.105
When the software has arrived at a proper size and orientation for
the face, it looks even more closely, seeking to create what is called a
faceprint.106 Much like a fingerprint record, a faceprint is a set of
characteristics that, taken together, uniquely identify one person’s
face. Elements of a faceprint include the relative locations of facial
features such as eyes, eyebrows, and nose shape.107 A person who has
small eyes, thick eyebrows, and a long narrow nose will have a very
different faceprint from someone with large eyes, thin eyebrows, and
a wide nose. Eyes are a key factor in accuracy.108 Large dark
sunglasses are more likely to reduce the accuracy of the software
than facial hair or regular prescription glasses.109
A faceprint can be compared with a single photo to verify the
identity of a known person, such as an employee seeking to enter a

101. Facial Recognition: Who’s Tracking You in Public?, CONSUMER REPS. (Dec. 30, 2015),
https://www.consumerreports.org/privacy/facial-recognition-who-is-tracking-you-in-public1
[https://perma.cc/XX2X-PW6X].
102. Id.
103. STAN Z. LI & ANIL K. JAIN, HANDBOOK OF FACE RECOGNITION 3–4 (2d ed. 2011).
104. Id. at 7.
105. See id.
106. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 90, at 4.
107. Id.
108. Cf. Andy Greenberg, How to Hide Your Face from Big Brother? Try Sunglasses, FORBES (Sept.
27, 2010, 9:55 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/andygreenberg/2010/09/27/how-to-hide-your-facefrom-big-brother-try-sunglasses/#22b3f781456f [https://perma.cc/4RQK-TKER] (explaining how
sunglasses or other methods of obscuring the area around the eyes can reduce the accuracy of facial
recognition software).
109. Id.
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secure area.110 Faceprints can also be compared to databases of many
images in hopes of identifying an unknown person.111
2. Problems in Execution
Lighting is a key factor affecting how well facial recognition
works.112 An evenly lit face seen directly from the front, with no
shadows and nothing blocking the camera’s view, is best.113 In
addition, whether an image of a face contrasts well with its
background, and how far away it is from the camera, can help or hurt
the facial recognition process.114 Uneven light, a bad angle, or a
strange expression can cause facial recognition to fail.115
Another very important challenge to successful facial recognition
is the degree to which the person being identified cooperates with—
or is even aware of—the process. People who know they are using
facial recognition, such as the employee trying to access a restricted
room, are relatively easy to work with.116 They know to look directly
at the camera in proper lighting to make conditions optimal for the
software analysis.117 Others do not know their faces are being
analyzed and may not even know that these systems are surveilling
them at all. Images of their faces are trickier to analyze; a face picked
out of a crowd may have to be digitally transformed and zoomed in
on before the software can generate a faceprint.118 That leaves more
room for the system to misidentify the person.119
When a facial recognition system incorrectly identifies a person,
the misidentification can cause a number of potential problems
depending on what kind of error has occurred. A system restricting
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.

See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 89, at 9.
LI & JAIN, supra note 103, at 3.
See id. at 2, 11.
See id.
See id. at 7.
See id.
See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 89, at 34–36.
See id.
See id. at 3 n.5, 16.
See id.
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access to a specific location could wrongly admit an unauthorized
person—if, say, she were wearing a disguise or even just looked
similar enough to someone who should be allowed in. Or it could
block the entry of an authorized person by failing to correctly
identify her.
In law enforcement, surveillance cameras cannot always obtain
good-quality images of a suspect’s face. That could mean identifying
an innocent person as a suspect or even failing to recognize a known
criminal who ran afoul of the law again. Regardless of how accurate
facial recognition appears to be on television crime dramas, room for
error exists, although the technology is improving. The NIST has
estimated that stated error rates are declining by 50% every two
years, and tests show they are currently around 0.8%.120 That is better
than voice recognition, which has error rates above 6%.121 But facial
recognition may still be more error-prone than iris scanning and
fingerprint scanning.122
Even if it is accurate, however, facial recognition raises privacy
concerns—perhaps even more so as accuracy improves.123 One of the
chief worries is that, much like the rise of DNA databases, facial
features and photos are being warehoused by government agencies,
enabling them to track people and erase any notion of privacy or
anonymity.124 New privacy issues are cropping up all of the time. A
new smartphone app, FindFace, allows people to take a person’s
photo and use facial recognition to find their social media
accounts.125 Ostensibly a convenient way to connect with friends and
120. G.H. Givens et al., Introduction to Face Recognition and Evaluation of Algorithm Performance,
67 COMPUTATIONAL STAT. & DATA ANALYSIS 236, 237 (2013); Alex Perala, NEC Gets Top Ranking in
Latest NIST Facial Recognition Test, FINDBIOMETRICS (Mar. 16, 2017), https://findbiometrics.com/necnist-facial-recognition-test-403163/ [https://perma.cc/K3ED-HG3A].
121. Liam Tung, Microsoft’s Newest Milestone? World’s Lowest Error Rate in Speech Recognition,
ZDNET (Sept. 14, 2016, 11:41 AM), http://www.zdnet.com/article/microsofts-newest-milestone-worldslowest-error-rate-in-speech-recognition/ [https://perma.cc/KR72-M8U5].
122. See generally Rupinder Saini & Narinder Rana, Comparison of Various Biometric Methods, 2
INT’L J. ADVANCES SCI. & TECH. 24 (2014),
http://www.sciencepublication.org/ijast/documents/ijastiss2/4.pdf [https://perma.cc/T89U-7CK6].
123. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 89, at 13.
124. See Solon, supra note 95.
125. Darlene Storm, Face Recognition App Findface May Make You Want to Take Down All Your
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coworkers, the app invites misuse. People can use it to expose
identities and harass others.126
These new capabilities also raise concerns about other malicious
uses of publicly available images. For example, when police issue
alerts about missing children, they often include a photograph of the
child’s face. There is little regulation or oversight, so nobody knows
whether those images are also being entered into facial recognition
systems.127 This, of course, does not even delve into issues such as
using facial recognition tools along with other technologies,
including police body cameras, geolocation software, and machine
learning to assist in real-time tracking.128 That goes beyond simple
identification and into the realm of where someone has been and
where the software predicts that person will go. Combining
technologies offers attractive options for crime fighting and deepens
the fissures in our privacy.
C. Sentencing Software: Prepackaged Risk Assessment
Risk and Needs Assessment (RNA) is another iteration in the
criminal justice system’s continued goal of managing increasing
incarceration rates with a limited budget through the use of
technological advancements. RNA’s original iteration, the selective
incapacitation movement, started in the 1980s mostly as a criminal
justice theory.129 The concept behind the theory was to identify and
Online
Photos,
COMPUTERWORLD
(May
18,
2016,
9:46
AM),
https://www.computerworld.com/article/3071920/data-privacy/face-recognition-app-findface-maymake-you-want-to-take-down-all-your-online-photos.html [https://perma.cc/8DHK-WNUK].
126. Olivia Solon, SXSW Panel Opens Window into Dangers of Facial Recognition Software,
GUARDIAN (Mar. 11, 2017, 7:00 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/culture/2017/mar/11/sxsw-facialrecognition-biometrics-surveillance-panel [https://perma.cc/Z4DC-GTVV]; Ethan Chiel, This Face
Recognition Company Is Causing Havoc in Russia—and Could Come to the U.S. Soon, SPLINTER (Apr.
29, 2016, 7:00 AM), https://splinternews.com/this-face-recognition-company-is-causing-havoc-in-russi1793856482 [https://perma.cc/2VSM-QQDG].
127. Solon, supra note 95.
128. Ava Kofman, Real-Time Face Recognition Threatens to Turn Cops’ Body Cameras into
Surveillance Machines, INTERCEPT (Mar. 22, 2017, 2:23 PM), https://theintercept.com/2017/03/22/realtime-face-recognition-threatens-to-turn-cops-body-cameras-into-surveillance-machines/
[https://perma.cc/RDK6-8SHD].
129. Tamar Lewin, Making Punishment Fit Future Crimes, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 14, 1982),
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incarcerate individuals prone to violence or recidivism for longer
periods, thereby leading to an overall reduction in the crime rate.130
As with many new, innovative systems, the selective incapacitation
system had serious flaws—the most notable of which were its
incredibly high false positive rates, which mistakenly identified
between fifty-four and ninety-nine percent of participating
individuals as “dangerous.”131
Although the theory of selective incapacitation was quickly
abandoned, its core concepts took root in legal literature, the broad
theory being refined into the utilitarian goal of decreasing the crime
rate by imprisoning the most dangerous felons while reducing mass
incarceration.132 The American system shifted to using clearer
sentencing practices and increased the use of sentencing guidelines,
culminating in Congress passing the Sentencing Reform Act (SRA)
in 1984, from which the federal sentencing guidelines are derived.133
The main theory behind the SRA was that sentencing practices had
become unfair and uncertain under the rehabilitative model; thus, the
U.S. Sentencing Commission formalized federal sentencing.134
1. Great in Theory
With a methodological and testable system instead of a purely
theoretical conception, an evidence-based “risk/needs assessment”
was at least ready to be tested out in practice and implemented into
the sentencing process.135 As of 2014, at least twelve states had
integrated some form of RNA tool into their sentencing procedures
through legislation, state sentencing policy, or a state supreme court

http://www.nytimes.com/1982/11/14/weekinreview/making-punishment-fit-future-crimes.html
[https://perma.cc/CM7T-VSQ9].
130. Id.
131. KEHL ET AL., supra note 20, at 4.
132. Id. at 3.
133. Id. at 7.
134. Id.
135. Sonja Starr, Evidence-Based Sentencing and the Scientific Rationalization of Discrimination, 66
STAN. L. REV. 803, 809 n.11 (2014).

Published by Reading Room, 2018

23

Georgia State University Law Review, Vol. 34, Iss. 4 [2018], Art. 6

1096

GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 34:4

decision.136 The process, as applied to the criminal justice system,
focuses on grouping offenders as low, medium, or high-risk
offenders; sentencing and treatment guidelines are assigned based on
these groupings.137
Although each RNA model uses its own algorithm or gives
different weight to an offender’s risk factors, the models generally try
to embrace rehabilitation while still providing the standards and
predictability of the retributive philosophy.138 Furthermore, most
RNA tools are based on the risk-needs-responsivity model (RNR),
which itself is based on the three eponymous principles: the risk
principle, which asserts that risk is predictable and offenders should
be treated differently based on the risk grouping; the needs principle,
which purports that rehabilitation and sentencing should be based on
the needs that contribute to criminal behavior; and the responsivity
principle, which describes how treatments should respond to each
specific offender.139
Perhaps the most comprehensive categorization of the goals
pursued by RNA tools is to (1) reduce judicial disparity; (2) promote
consistent sentencing; (3) prioritize and allocate correctional
resources; (4) adjust punishments for certain categories of offenders;
(5) reduce prison overcrowding; and (6) encourage the use of nonincarceration sanctions.140 Still, it is possible that different tools use
modified or completely different principles, and depending on the
system’s algorithmic confidentiality, it may be impossible to know
exactly what principles a specific tool prioritizes when determining
an offender’s risk group and ultimate sentence.
For example, the Northpointe Institute for Public Management’s
Correctional Offender Management Profiling for Alternative
136. Id.
137. Richard E. Redding, Evidence-Based Sentencing: The Science of Sentencing Policy and
Practice, 1 CHAPMAN J. CRIM. JUST. 1, 3–4 (2009), http://works.bepress.com/richard_redding/11
[https://perma.cc/93WC-QEGU].
138. KEHL ET AL., supra note 20, at 8.
139. Id. at 10.
140. Kelly Hannah-Moffat, Actuarial Sentencing: An “Unsettled” Proposition, 30 JUST. Q. 195, 271
(2013).
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Sanctions—better known as COMPAS—was developed in 1998 and
was last updated in 2005.141 COMPAS is currently being used by
departments of corrections and rehabilitation in California, Michigan,
New Mexico, New York, South Carolina, Wisconsin, and
Wyoming.142 It is worth noting that only corrections departments
have used COMPAS in their procedures, while courts have either
been disallowed from using it or unimpressed by its results.143 Due to
this system’s prolific use, however, and its use as evidence in the
fairly recent Loomis case, discussed below, the system will be
evaluated on its merits as a decision-making tool for judges as well as
for corrections officers.
COMPAS contains 43 separate scales formed from 135 risk items,
which can be mixed and matched to different offender populations at
different points of the criminal justice system to make a custom-built
risk assessment for the particular department in question.144 The risk
items and scales are picked and formed by instrument developers,
reflecting the fact that COMPAS is a company secret and that most
of its algorithmic methodology is unknown.145 The creators,
however, do assert that their risk and needs factors include the eight
normative subgroups that are utilized by many other risk analysis
systems.146 Although COMPAS still keeps its precise methodology
and algorithm as a trade secret, this alignment with similar systems
gives scholars a reference point as to COMPAS’s approach.
It bears noting that, at least in Wisconsin courts, COMPAS must
include the following five written warnings to judges reviewing a
case with the assistance of a COMPAS risk score readout: (1) the
141. PAMELA M. CASEY ET AL., NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, OFFENDER RISK & NEEDS
ASSESSMENT INSTRUMENTS: A PRIMER FOR COURTS app. at A-20 (2014).
142. Id.
143. Ed Yong, A Popular Algorithm Is No Better at Predicting Crimes Than Random People,
ATLANTIC (Jan. 17, 2018), https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2018/01/equivant-compasalgorithm/550646/ [https://perma.cc/3LAV-Y7K7].
144. See NORTHPOINTE, PRACTITIONERS GUIDE TO COMPAS CORE 2 (2015),
http://www.northpointeinc.com/downloads/compas/Practitioners-Guide-COMPAS-Core-_031915.pdf
[https://perma.cc/DWK4-KBWP].
145. Id. at 26.
146. Id. at 11.
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proprietary nature of COMPAS prevents the disclosure of how the
risk scores are formulated; (2) COMPAS risk scores cannot identify
specific high-risk offenders due to its scores being derived from
group data; (3) COMPAS relies on a national data sample and has not
been cross-validated with a Wisconsin population; (4) studies have
warned that COMPAS disproportionately classifies minority
offenders as having a higher risk of recidivism; and (5) COMPAS
was developed specifically to help correctional departments in postsentencing determinations.147 Despite these warnings, particularly the
fifth warning, Wisconsin courts are allowed to take risk scores into
consideration during presentencing determinations, and any legal and
constitutional objections raised have proven unsuccessful to bar the
use of risk scores.148
2. Problems in Execution
This leads to an underlying, pervasive ambiguity regarding the
quintessential measuring factor of all RNA tools, calling their
effectiveness into question. With such an imprecise measure of the
core assessment standards of RNA tools, the system seems to
function as junk science protected behind the wizard’s curtain. This
assessment is supported by a recent study which found that
crowdsourced predictions from a random survey were more accurate
at predicting rates of recidivism than those from COMPAS, even
though the survey-takers based their decisions off only two factors
(COMPAS uses 137 inputs, including 6 risk factors in its
assessment).149 Yet, the lack of an empirically watertight basis is not
enough to discard a system from the court of law, as expressed by the
147. Criminal Law—Sentencing Guidelines—Wisconsin Supreme Court Requires Warning Before
Use of Algorithmic Risk Assessments in Sentencing—State v. Loomis, 881 N.W.2d 749 (Wis. 2016), 130
HARV. L. REV. 1530, 1533 (2017).
148. Id. at 1536–37.
149. Seth Augenstein, COMPAS Software to Predict Recidivism No More Accurate Than
Crowdsourcing,
Study
Says,
FORENSIC
MAG.
(Jan.
18,
2018,
1:12
PM),
https://www.forensicmag.com/news/2018/01/compas-software-predict-recidivism-no-more-accuratecrowdsourcing-study-says?et_cid=6237469&et_rid=%%subscriberid%%&type=headline
[https://perma.cc/7QYE-ZXUD].
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Supreme Court in Heller v. Doe when it said, “[t]he problems of
government are practical ones and may justify, if they do not require,
rough accommodations—[however] illogical, it may be, and
unscientific.”150 On this point, courts across the nation have been
clear: just because the system is incapable of scientifically
identifying with certainty an individual’s chance of recidivism does
not by itself invalidate the use of RNA tools in the sentencing
process.151
The RNA algorithms lack the ability to control for several
contingent factors. For example, the tendency of the tools to overrate
male minorities over other offenders should automatically be a red
flag. Some studies suggest that such factors cannot be controlled for,
and the use of RNA tools will only aggravate the prison population’s
racial imbalance.152 This capacity for algorithmic software to develop
racial prejudices is well-documented.153 For example, at first glance,
Microsoft’s @TayTweets, a quirky artificial intelligence-based
Twitter account that learned to produce racist responses in
conversation after less than twenty-four hours of live interaction with
the Twitter universe, seemed like a comical mistake.154
When the same principle applies to RNA programs that commonly
learn the same prejudices and consequently issue disproportionate
recommendations or assessments to defendants of color, however, it
is time to stop laughing.155 Harsher critics point out that prior
criminal history is merely a proxy for race and that the adoption of
RNA tools would exacerbate such an issue.156 Professor Bernard

150. Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 321 (1993).
151. See, e.g., State v. Loomis, 881 N.W.2d 749, 763–64 (Wis. 2016).
152. Starr, supra note 135, at 838.
153. Julia
Angwin
et
al.,
Machine
Bias,
PROPUBLICA
(May
23,
2016),
https://www.propublica.org/article/machine-bias-risk-assessments-in-criminal-sentencing
[https://perma.cc/BA3T-KJWU].
154. Elle Hunt, Tay, Microsoft’s AI Chatbot, Gets a Crash Course in Racism from Twitter,
GUARDIAN (Mar. 24, 2016, 2:41 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2016/mar/24/taymicrosofts-ai-chatbot-gets-a-crash-course-in-racism-from-twitter [https://perma.cc/E3ZW-SVNX].
155. Angwin et al., supra note 153.
156. Bernard E. Harcourt, Risk as a Proxy for Race 2 (Univ. of Chi. Pub. Law & Legal Theory,
Working Paper No. 323, 2010).
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Harcourt, in a forthcoming paper, examines previous actuarial
assessments of the criminal population to tackle high rates of
incarceration, including such assessments as early selective
incapacitation, which resulted in a sharp increase in black
representation in detention and incarceration.157 Harcourt further
notes that, as RNA tools have developed and evolved, the number of
factors considered, as well as the increased focus on prior criminal
history as a main factor in evaluation, has led to the further unequal
targeting of blacks over other races.158
Gender is another difficult measurement factor, although for
different reasons. Usually dismissed as a verified correlation, there
are recognized and significant gender disparities in recidivism rates
and rehabilitation potential.159 The case cited in the Loomis decision,
Craig v. Boren, stands as a seminal case concerning the
unconstitutionality of using gender discrimination in lawmaking;
however, like in Loomis, courts have often not considered the
statistical use of gender in actuarial studies as an unconstitutional
procedure.160 As such, gender as a factor in RNA tools remains
permissible, with any potential constitutional issues placated, if it is
sufficiently reinforced with proper statistical evidence.
Subjective bias in judicial decisions setting bail or sentences
should obviously be avoided, but no magic switch can be flipped to
resolve the problem. RNA software is constructed by imperfect
people, and their prejudices often spill over into their work despite
even the best intentions. As that same software executes machine
learning, the potential for substantial unfairness increases with its
level of exposure. Although RNA software is promoted as a shift
from biased practices to objective decision-making, without greater
transparency and scrutiny, it merely hides the same biases from
public view without diminishing their influence.
157. Id. at 3–4.
158. Id. at 4.
159. Melissa Hamilton, Risk-Needs Assessment: Constitutional and Ethical Challenges, 52 AM.
CRIM. L. REV. 231, 254 (2015).
160. Id. at 252.
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CONCLUSION
Algorithms are becoming an integral part of the criminal justice
system, ultimately influencing a person’s decision on the freedom or
incarceration of a defendant. Algorithms are complex, difficult to
understand, and often a mystery to pull apart, understood only by the
company selling the algorithmic program. Currently, most are
protected behind the cloak of trade secret, despite Confrontation
Clause and other constitutional concerns.
In the end, the parties using algorithms in their decision-making
processes must rely on the assumption that the programs’ creators
balanced public safety and fairness to ethical levels. Basic machine
learning techniques are already being used in the criminal justice
system. Further, the not-far-off role of artificial intelligence in our
courts creates two potential paths for the criminal justice and legal
communities: either blindly allow the march of technology to go
forward, or create a moratorium on the use of opaque technologies in
criminal justice risk assessment until processes and procedures
allowing for a meaningful examination of these tools are in place.
The legal community has never fully discussed the implications of
algorithmic tools. Now, attorneys and judges are grappling with the
lack of oversight and the impact of these tools after their
proliferation. To hit pause would allow courts time to create rules
governing how algorithmic software can and should be used. It
would give policymakers the window necessary to create standards
and provide a mechanism for oversight. Finally, it would allow
educational and advocacy organizations time to teach attorneys how
to properly handle these novel tools in court.
These steps can reinforce the rule of law and protect individual
rights. We should remember Melvin Kranzberg’s first law of
technology: it is neither good nor bad, but it certainly is not
neutral.161 His sixth law of technology is equally relevant:
161. Christopher Mims, The Six Laws of Technology Everyone Should Know, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 26,
2017, 8:00 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-6-laws-of-technology-everyone-should-know-
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“Technology is a very human activity.”162 To blindly accept these
algorithm-driven technologies in our courts without a plan is to defer
to machines in a way that should make any advocate of judicial or
prosecutorial discretion uncomfortable. Technology provides
powerful tools, but the law is often ill-equipped to keep pace with
new developments. If we are to use these technologies when life and
liberty are at stake, we must engage with its possibilities and its
detriments and understand the issues of accuracy, fairness, and ethics
these new capabilities raise.

1511701201 [https://perma.cc/WV5J-YUH7].
162. Id.
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